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Abstract
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in
their intrinsic motivation to work at a rm. We characterise optimal
incentive schemes and examine how the rm can attract and select
highly motivated workers to ll a vacancy when workersmotivation is
private information. While posting a higher wage increases the prob-
ability of lling the vacancy, it decreases the expected average quality
of job applicants, because a higher wage induces workers who are less
motivated to apply. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-o¤ be-
tween the probability of lling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker,
and the expected motivation of the selected worker.
Keywords: Signaling and screening models; Intrinsic motivation;
Monetary incentive schemes; Wage posting; Minimum wage.
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1 Introduction
Economic models of worker behaviour typically assume that people dislike
working. Hence, in order to induce workers to exert e¤ort, employers must
provide external incentives. Employers have di¤erent means to increase
workers e¤ort. For instance, the introduction of pay-for-performance de-
vices will induce employees to work harder. Equivalently, closer monitoring
of workerse¤ort, accompanied by sanctions (e.g. dismissal) in case of shirk-
ing, will also result in higher e¤ort.
Empirical research suggests that the standard neoclassical view of worker
behaviour is often too narrow. Agell and Lundborg (1999) report results
of a survey among managers in Swedish manufacturing and conclude that
much recent theorizing about e¤ort and incentives is potentially misplaced
[because] most managers appear to ascribe a more important motivational
role to psychological and sociological factors than to economic sticks and
carrots(p. 25). Interviews with US managers by Bewley (1998) yield cor-
responding results. Rather than monetary incentives, managers emphasize
that work should be interesting and stimulating, that workers should feel in-
volved in decision-making, and that workersachievements are noticed and
appreciated.1 One Swedish manager responded that people work hard as
long as they have fun.
Surveys among employees also indicate that monetary rewards are of
much less importance for job satisfaction and workerse¤ort than postulated
in economic analysis. For instance, in a 1977 survey of the US labour force,
half of the respondents agreed with the statement that what I do at work
is more important to me than the money I earn, and more than 90 percent
stated that they put in more e¤ort into their job than required (Quinn and
Staines, 1979). Even though we should be cautious (or even suspicious)
about stated preferences, the results of these surveys suggest that a large
part of the labour force is motivated at work by more than just monetary
rewards (Baron, 1988).
The observation that workers may provide e¤ort for non-pecuniary rea-
sons has two important implications. First, monetary incentive schemes
designed to motivate a standard neoclassical workermay be suboptimal.
Second, when people di¤er in their motivation, the performance of a rm
may become dependent on its capability to select the most motivatedcan-
didate among job applicants.
This paper relaxes the standard assumption in the economic literature
that people dislike working to study these issues. We develop a model in
1Bartram et al. (1995) asked 498 small business in the UK which qualities of young
workers they regard as important. The employers ranked interest in the workthird, just
below honesty an integrityand conscientiousness, and just above general personality
and motivation and drive, all with average ratings above 3.4 on a 4-point scale. General
ability, educational qualications and work experience were considered less important.
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which workers to a certain extent like to exert e¤ort at the workplace. Hence,
people like their job, not only because they get paid, but also because they
enjoy working. Whereas this type of motivation has for long been virtu-
ally absent in mainstream economics, psychologists have argued that people
undertake many activities without expecting an extrinsic reward. Intrinsic
motivationis considered to be of major importance for human behaviour
(see e.g. DeCharms, 1968, Deci, 1971, and Furnham, 1990).
Recently, a few papers in economics have studied wages and incentive
schemes when workers are intrinsically motivated (Benabou and Tirole,
2003, Besley and Ghatak, 2004, Francois, 2000, and Glazer, 2004). The
main distinguishing feature of our paper is that we allow workersmoti-
vation to be private knowledge. As a result, the rm can not select the
best-motivated worker among the job applicants. Hence, an adverse selec-
tion problem arises. We show that it may be in the interest of the rm
to o¤er a low wage so as to discourage relatively low motivated workers
from applying. This comes at the cost of a higher probability of leaving
the vacancy unlled. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-o¤ between
the probability of lling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker, and the
expected motivation of the selected worker.
People may be intrinsically motivated to work for di¤erent reasons. One
might simply like to undertake certain activities. The activities which are
intrinsically valued, and hence the evaluation of intrinsic qualities of di¤erent
jobs, may vary across people. A motivated veterinary surgeon is not likely
to be motivated to work as a butcher. Intrinsic motivation is not solely
determined by persons, jobs, or rms, but by combinations of certain people
and certain jobs or rms.
Intrinsic motivation may also be related to self-esteem, broadly dened
as how people think about themselves. Thus, people may be intrinsically
motivated to work (or to refrain from shirking), because it makes them think
better about themselves. Self-esteem may be enhanced by working or re-
fraining from shirking in general, but it may also be related to particular kind
of jobs. For instance, workers in hospitals may feel that they contribute to a
goal which is considered to be good. Dixit (2002) notes that organisations
that serve an idealistic or ethical purpose may be particularly attractive for
people who share these goals. Obviously, which goals are considered to be
goodmay di¤er among individuals.
Regardless of the precise reason for the enjoyment of or satisfaction from
work, the baseline is that people can derive utility from working. The pres-
ence of intrinsically motivated workers has important implications for rms.
Motivated people probably work harder, which increases output. And be-
cause people derive utility from the job, they may be willing to work for a
lower wage. People will take job satisfaction into account when deciding on
whether to accept or reject a wage o¤er. A higher wage at another job may
not compensate for the loss of intrinsic qualities of the job.
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We develop a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic
motivation to work at a particular rm. Working at the rm has some
unique trait which is valued di¤erently by di¤erent workers, giving the rm
monopsony power.2 We study two issues. First, we examine the implications
of workersintrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We
extend a standard incentive wage model and show that  in line with Dixit
 motivated workers work harder and, for a given level of e¤ort, are willing
to work for a lower wage. The higher the rms bargaining power, the
more it can extract the motivational rents from the worker. When the
rm has su¢ cient bargaining power, a more motivated worker brings about
higher output and, under a mild condition, lower wage cost. We also show
that when the rm has a decreasing returns to e¤ort production technology,
monetary incentives are weaker, the more motivated its workers.
Second, we examine how the rm can attract and select highly moti-
vated workers to ll a vacancy. We assume that each worker has positive
probability of observing the vacancy. The workers who observe the vacancy
decide whether or not to apply, taking application cost into account. We
consider three cases which di¤er in the assumption made about the observ-
ability of applicantsmotivation. We start with the assumption that the
rm can observe the motivation of applicants. Next, we consider the case
where the rm can not observe the motivation of the applicants. Lastly, we
allow the applicants to credibly signal their motivation to the rm.
We will show that in all of these cases, it is optimal for the rm to commit
to a minimum wage o¤er, either because commitment resolves the Diamond
paradox (Diamond, 1971) or because it avoids a lemons problem (Akerlof,
1970). When motivation of applicants is observable to the rm, the rm
hires the worker with the best motivation among those who applied. The
prot-maximising level of the minimum wage is determined by the trade-
o¤ between wage cost and the probability of lling the vacancy. When
motivation is unobservable, there is an additional selection e¤ect. A higher
minimum wage decreases the expected quality of job applicants, as it induces
less motivated workers to apply for the job. Hence, the probability that a
highly motivated worker is selected decreases. However, if applicants can
signal their motivation to the rm, a commitment to a minimum wage gives
them an incentive to reveal their motivation, which eliminates the selection
e¤ect.
The di¤erent assumptions about the observability of applicantsmotiva-
2Manning (2003, p. 4) argues that heterogeneity in workerspreferences is one of the
three most plausible sources of frictions in the labour market, giving rms monopsonistic
power. Monopsony power arises naturally when intrinsic motivation is rm-specic. Dixit
argues that company spiritin private rms and the idealistic purpose served by a public
agency may motivate agents. When intrinsic motivation is related to an occupation rather
than to working at a particular rm, monopsony power arises only if there are no other
rms (in the neighbourhood) o¤ering similar jobs.
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tion may reect di¤erent screening technologies employed by rms, ranging
from application forms and job interviews to work trials and the use of as-
sessment centres (see Keenan, 1995, and Bartram et al.). The use of tests in
the screening process has increased substantially over the last decades (Jenk-
ins, 2001). The personality and workstyle questionnairehas become one
of the most widely used test types (Ryan et al., 1999). While these ndings
may suggest that rms have ample opportunities to determine applicants
motivation, the performance of applicants in such tests may be subject to
their choice of e¤ort and behaviour, implying that applicants may have a
choice whether or not to reveal their motivation to the rm.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related liter-
ature. Section 3 examines the implications of workersintrinsic motivation
for optimal monetary incentive schemes. In Section 4 we study how the rm
can attract and select highly motivated workers to ll a vacancy, assuming
that the rm can only o¤er a xed wage. Section 5 generalises the results
of Section 4 to the case of optimal monetary incentive schemes, as studied
in Section 3. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Intrinsic motivation has, until recently, been largely ignored in economic
analysis, with the exception of the work by Bruno Frey (see among others
Frey, 1993, 1997a, and 1997b). We di¤er from his work in our focus on
sorting and selection issues. Moreover, we abstract from the possibility that
external incentives crowd out a workers intrinsic motivation. Therefore, in
our model, it is always in the rms interest to provide monetary incentives,
even when a worker is highly motivated. However, high wages reduce the
average intrinsic motivation among the pool of job candidates, and may
thus reduce labour productivity unless the rm can fully observe applicants
intrinsic motivation.
The idea that, all else equal, workers are willing to work for a lower
wage at jobs with intrinsic qualities traces back to Adam Smiths Wealth of
Nations. The theory of equalising di¤erences (Brown, 1980, Rosen, 1986)
states that all (dis)amenities of a job are reected in its wage. Several
studies suggest that the opportunity to contribute to the goals of a non-
prot organisation is valued by workers and may explain the wage di¤erential
between non-prot and for-prot organisations (see e.g. Hansmann, 1980,
Preston, 1989, Frank, 1996, and Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Recent empirical
evidence is provided by Leete (2001) and Frey, Kucher, and Stutzer (2001).
This paper contributes to this literature by examining the e¤ect of intrinsic
motivation on optimal pay-for-performance schemes and on recruitment and
selection of job applicants.
Most of our analysis focuses on the case where workersmotivation is
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unobservable to the rm. Hence, our model is a principal-agent model where
the agent (the worker) has private information about his type. Benabou
and Tirole, by contrast, focus on the case where the principal has private
information about the attractiveness of the job to workers. The choice of
the wage scheme by the principal may then signal his private knowledge to
the worker. As a result, extrinsic rewards may either crowd in or crowd
out intrinsic motivation. Several recent papers study incentive provision to
intrinsically motivated workers, among others Besley and Ghatak, Francois,
and Glazer. In these papers, as in ours, rms have all the bargaining power.
In contrast to our paper, these papers assume that the rm can observe
workersintrinsic motivation.3
Our analysis builds on signaling and screening models of the labour mar-
ket. A seminal paper in this eld is Spence (1973), and a recent survey of
the literature is Riley (2001). Most studies focus on screening of workers
abilities. The setup of our model is closely related to the ability-models. As
in our model, rms must commit to pay high wages to induce workers to sig-
nal their type. An important di¤erence between the ability-models and our
model is that motivation not only a¤ects workers productivity, but also his
willingness to work. Moreover, our model departs from the standard screen-
ing model by assuming that the rm faces several job applicants, among
which it chooses, as in Janssen (2002). The standard model considers the
case of one worker and two rms, see Cho and Kreps (1987).
Our work is also related to the job search literature, in particular to
directed search models (see e.g. Burdett, Shi, and Wright, 2001, and Shi,
2002). Montgomery (1991) argues that rms that face high cost of leaving
a vacancy unlled o¤er higher wages. The reason is that workers send an
application with higher probability to rms that o¤er higher wages. Hence,
rms increase their probability of lling the vacancy by posting a higher
wage, as in our model. Another common element is that workers base their
application decision on the probability of getting the job, which depends on
the expected total number of applicants for this job.
Closest to our paper is Handy and Katz (1998). They study a model in
which potential employees di¤er in both ability and motivation. While the
rm can test for an applicants ability, it can not distinguish motivated from
unmotivated workers. Handy and Katz show that to promote self-selection
among potential employees, the rm has an incentive to commit itself to pay
a low wage. By committing to pay a low wage, the rm is certain that a job
applicant is a motivated worker. Our analysis di¤ers from theirs in various
respects. First, we assume that the rm can not draw on an innitely large
pool of applicants consisting of all types of workers. In our model, the rm
3The kind of intrinsic motivation that we focus on in this paper di¤ers from an intrinsic
motivation to behave reciprocally, as studied by Akerlof (1982) and Falk et al. (1999),
or intrinsic feelings of altruism towards ones colleagues or boss, which is studied by
Rotemberg (1994).
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can not be certain that the worker who is most motivated for the job has
observed the vacancy and, hence, is in the pool of job applicants. Therefore,
a commitment to pay the lowest possible wage (the wage which is accept-
able only to the most motivated worker in the economy) is in general not
optimal for the rm. For it precludes hiring a worker who is somewhat less
motivated when the most motivated worker in the economy is not available.
Hence, the rm optimally sets a minimum wage which attracts workers with
di¤erent  albeit high  levels of motivation to apply for the job. Sec-
ond, Handy and Katz do not consider the decision of potential employees
to apply for a job. We show that their results depend on the assumption
that application costs are zero. Positive application costs, however small,
imply that a maximum wage is of no avail, whereas a minimum wage helps
to attract and select highly motivated workers. Application costs are likely
to be positive, given the time and e¤ort involved in writing an application,
having job interviews, and possibly performing tests, attending an assess-
ment centre, or even undertaking a work trial. Lastly, our analysis allows
for signaling by workers and o¤ering performance pay by rms.
3 Optimal Monetary Incentive Schemes for Moti-
vated Workers
This section explores the implications of workers intrinsic motivation for
the optimal design of monetary incentive schemes. The literature (see e.g.
Lazear, 1995) usually assumes a workers utility function of the form:
U [w(e); e]
where utility is concave in income (U1 > 0; U11 < 0), income depends on
e¤ort according to the wage scheme w(e), and the cost of exerting e¤ort is
convex (U2 < 0; U22 < 0). We introduce intrinsic motivation by adding a
third argument to the utility function:4
U [w(e); e; ie] (1)
where i 2 [0; ]. i measures the degree to which worker i is intrinsically
motivated, which varies between di¤erent kind of jobs. The positive utility
derived from e¤ort is assumed to be concave in e (U3 > 0; U33 < 0).5 Hence,
apart from an indirect e¤ect of e¤ort on income through the wage scheme,
utility rst increases in e¤ort and then, starting from some level depending
4Without signicant loss of generality, we introduce intrinsic motivation as a third
argument in the utility function - and not as a modication of the second argument - for
ease of exposition.
5Constant, or even increasing, marginal positive utility from e¤ort does not a¤ect the
results as long as optimal e¤ort is nite (i.e., we abstract from workaholics). We also
assume U3 >  eU33, a condition that will be discussed below.
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Figure 1: The e¤ect of intrinsic motivation on the direct utility of e¤ort
on the value of i, starts decreasing, see Figure 1. Depending on the level
of e, total utility derived from exerting e¤ort may be positive or negative.
For convenience, we assume that all cross-derivatives are zero: Uij = 0 for
all i 6= j.
The rms prot depends on the e¤ort of the worker:
 = q(e)  w(e) (2)
Prot is the di¤erence between the value of the output generated by the
e¤ort of the worker, q (e), and the wage cost. The production function has
decreasing returns to workers e¤ort, q0(e) > 0 and q00(e) < 0.
In this section, we assume that the rm observes the workers motivation
 and has all the bargaining power. The rm sets wage cost as low as
possible, but the wage must meet the workers participation constraint:
U [w(e); e; ie]  Uout  U(b; 0; 0) (3)
where Uout is the outside option of the worker. We assume that the workers
alternative to employment at this rm is living on an unemployment benet
b. More generally, the outside option of the worker would take into account
expected job opportunities at other rms. If other rms would o¤er jobs
with the same kind of intrinsic qualities, a workers outside option would
depend on his motivation. This would weaken our argument that motivated
workers are willing to work for a lower wage. In a related paper, we analyse
the e¤ects of competition in the labour market for intrinsically motivated
workers (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2002). There, we show that competition leads
to higher wages, stronger incentives, and higher productivity. In this paper,
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we abstract from outside job opportunities. We thus focus on situations
where the rm has (su¢ cient) monopsonistic power, either because workers
intrinsic motivation is rm-specic or because there are no other rms (in
the neighbourhood) o¤ering jobs with the same intrinsic qualities.
The workers optimal amount of e¤ort is found by maximising the utility
function (1) to e:
max U ! w0(e)U1() + U2() + iU3() = 0 (4)
In the optimum, the workers (nancial and motivational) marginal benets
of e¤ort equal the marginal cost of e¤ort.
The rm maximises prots. Since the rm has all the bargaining power,
it sets the workers total compensation such that it leaves no rents to the
worker. Though the rm does not directly control the workers e¤ort e, it
can design a monetary incentive scheme that induces the worker to exert
the optimal level of e¤ort:6
max  s:t: U()  Uout ! q0(e)  w0(e) = 0 (5)
In the optimum, the marginal product equals marginal wage cost.
First-order conditions (4) and (5) imply that if the rm sets the wage
scheme optimally, the workers marginal utility of e¤ort, apart from the e¤ect
of extra e¤ort on his income, is negative. Hence, people stating that they
enjoy every aspect of their work (my work is my hobby) are simply exerting
too little e¤ort (or, in other words, their wage scheme is suboptimal). Note
also that (4) and (5) imply that monetary incentives are stronger, the less
motivated is the worker (i.e., w0(e) is larger, the lower i). Important for
this result is our assumption that q00(e) < 0. With constant returns to e¤ort
[q00(e) = 0], the optimal reward per unit of e¤ort w0(e) equals the marginal
product of e¤ort q0(e), which is constant when q00(e) = 0:
The rm sets total compensation to the worker such that it leaves no
rents to the worker. In the optimum, the rm creates a compensation scheme
which induces the worker to choose the level of e¤ort dened by (4) and (5)
at the lowest cost to the rm, implying that the worker ends up with a total
utility of U = Uout, dened by (3).
Intrinsic motivation has two important e¤ects. First, the higher , the
higher the maximum wage the rm is willing to o¤er. Stated di¤erently,
given the level of the wage, it is more protable to the rm to hire a worker
who is more motivated. The maximum wage the rm is willing to o¤er is
the wage which would leave the rm with zero prot:
w(e) = q(e) (6)
6When neither e¤ort nor production is veriable, the rm cannot induce workers to
provide optimal e¤ort. We deal with this case at the end of this section.
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Since marginal productivity q0(e) is positive, we have to show that e increases
in . Applying the implicit function theorem to (4) results in:
de
d
=
U3() + eU33()
 @2U()=@e2 (7)
where @2U()=@e2 < 0 is the second-order condition to the workers optimi-
sation problem (4). E¤ort increases in a workers motivation if U3 >  eU33.
We assume that this condition holds: it is unlikely that a more motivated
worker works less hard because he enjoys working already so much. More
e¤ort implies more output. Hence, the maximum wage the rm is willing to
o¤er increases in the workers motivation.
Second, given the level of e¤ort, intrinsic motivation a¤ects the wage the
rm needs to o¤er to meet the workers participation constraint. We show
that for constant e = e^, the minimum wage for which the worker is willing to
work decreases in . Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) results
in:
dw(e^)
d
=   e^U3()
U1() < 0 (8)
The expression in (8) is always negative: Given the level of e¤ort, a worker
who is more motivated for the job needs to be compensated less.
In general, the e¤ect of motivation on total wage compensation is am-
biguous. A more motivated worker needs to be compensated less for each
unit of e¤ort. However, he exerts more e¤ort than less motivated workers,
implying that the total wage may be increasing in motivation. In appendix
1 we prove that dw(e)d < 0 if the following condition holds:
eU3() >  [U2() + iU3()]
de
d
(9)
The right-hand side of this inequality denotes the net increase in disutility
due to the higher level of e¤ort. The left-hand side is the increase in motiva-
tional utility derived from all e¤ort the worker exerts, because of the higher
motivation. If, in the new optimum, the increased pleasure of working is
higher than the burden of the additional e¤ort, highly motivated workers
need less nancial compensation than less motivated workers.
Higher motivation thus has two e¤ects: the rm is willing to o¤er a higher
wage, while, given the level of e¤ort, the worker is willing to accept a lower
wage. Motivation therefore increases the joint surplus of the worker and the
rm. When the rm has all the bargaining power, it can extract all rents
from the motivation of the worker by adjusting the compensation scheme.
This implies that, if condition (9) is satised, more motivated workers will
be o¤ered lower wages, even though they are more productive.7 Hence,
7Allowing for a more equal distribution of bargaining power between the rm and the
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without a commitment of the rm not to extract all motivational rents, job
applicants may be reluctant to reveal their motivation to the rm, or worse
even, the rm may not be able to attract any applicant at all. Section 4
addresses this problem.
Both e¤ects of intrinsic motivation are also present in the case of a xed
wage. When the rm is unable or unwilling to use incentive wages,8 the
optimal level of e¤ort of the worker is given by (4) with w0(e) equal to zero.
The e¤ect of intrinsic motivation on e¤ort is still given by (7). E¤ort and
thus output increase in the workers motivation. This is also clear from
Figure 1: a workers optimal e¤ort with a xed wage is given by the top of
the curve, which moves to the right, the higher is . Hence, the maximum
xed wage the rm is willing to o¤er increases in the workers motivation.
Moreover, the minimum xed wage a worker is willing to accept decreases
in motivation. By using rst-order condition (4), we can rewrite condition
(9) to:
eU3() > w0(e)U1() de
d
(10)
In case of a xed wage, w0(e) = 0, condition (10) always holds. Therefore,
the higher motivation, the higher the direct utility from e¤ort, and the lower
the wage needs to be in order to meet the participation constraint of the
worker.
4 Attracting and Selecting Motivated Workers
This section examines how a rm can attract and select highly motivated
workers to ll a vacancy. We consider three cases: One where the rm can
observe the motivation of the applicants, one where it can not, and one
where workers decide whether or not to signal their motivation. To focus
on the distributional conict between the rm and the worker, we abstract
from monetary incentives and assume that the rm o¤ers a base salary only.
Allowing for monetary incentives does not a¤ect the results qualitatively,
which we show in Section 5, but it distracts attention from our main results.
workers need not a¤ect this result. As long as the rm has su¢ cient bargaining power,
the wage of the worker decreases in motivation, provided that condition (9) holds. See
Appendix 2.
8One reason why rms may refrain from providing monetary incentives to motivated
workers is high monitoring cost, see Weiss (1990, pp. 73-76). In case of multiple tasks,
monetary incentives may crowd out facets of tasks which are hard to observe by facets
of tasks which are more easily observed (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Alternatively,
monetary incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation, see Frey (1997a) and Benabou
and Tirole.
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4.1 Setup of the Model
A rm has one vacancy, and posts a help-wantedad. As in the previous
section, the rm has all the bargaining power. However, we assume that the
rm can credibly commit to pay at least a certain wage by posting a base
salary wmin in the ad. Workers di¤er in their intrinsic motivation  2 [0; ]
to work at this rm, while their outside options are identical, Uout. There is
a discrete number of worker types in the economy, with ni workers of type
i. Denote by Ni the total number of workers with motivation equal to or
higher than i:
Ni =
X
i
n (11)
Each worker has probability  of observing the ad, 0 <  < 1. One reason
for  < 1 could be that not all workers read the newspaper every day. As a
result, the rm is uncertain about the composition of the group of potential
applicants. If a worker decides to apply, she incurs application cost C.9
Following the results from the previous section, worker is indirect utility
function can be written as U(i; w), with properties U() > 0 and Uw() > 0,
and prots of the rm as (i; w), with properties () > 0 and w() < 0.
Since condition (9) is always satised in case of a xed wage, the minimum
wage o¤er a worker is willing to accept decreases in motivation. That is, if
 > 0, then U(;w) = U(0; w0) implies that w < w0.
4.2 Observable Motivation
Suppose the rm can observe the level of intrinsic motivation of each appli-
cant during the selection process. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The rm posts a help-wantedad, in which it can credibly commit to
a minimum wage.
2. The workers who observe the ad decide whether or not to apply. If a
worker applies, she incurs cost C.
3. The rm observes the types of all applicants, selects one applicant,
and makes her a wage o¤er w.
4. The applicant accepts or rejects. Rejection results in zero prots.10
9 Instead of  < 1, we could also assume that C is a random variable which di¤ers
among workers. Important for the results is that the rm faces some uncertainty about
the composition of the group of applicants.
10A more general set-up of the game would allow the rm to make a wage o¤er to
another applicant (or a better wage o¤er to the same worker) after a rejection. While
this could reduce the probability to end up with an unlled vacancy, it may increase the
rents that have to be left to the hired worker. Workers may wait for a next (higher) wage
o¤er at the risk that an other applicant accepts one of the rms next o¤ers. Allowing for
multiple wage o¤ers will also a¤ect the decision to apply. We leave this for future research.
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We rst consider the case where the rm has not committed to a min-
imum wage at stage 1. We solve the model by backward induction. The
optimal strategy of each worker at stage 4 is simple: Accept if and only
if U(i; w)  Uout. Application costs are sunk at this stage. As prots
increase in the workers motivation, the rm optimally selects the most mo-
tivated worker among the applicants. The optimal wage o¤er is such that
U(;w) = Uout. This strategy of the rm at stage 3 makes that no worker
applies at stage 2. Each worker anticipates that the rm extracts all rents
of her motivation, leaving the worker with the sunk application cost.11 This
result is known as the Diamond paradox (Diamond; see also Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999).12
To give workers an incentive to apply, the rm must make a credible
commitment not to extract all rents from their motivation. It can do so by
putting a minimum wage wmin in the ad at stage 1.13 If the minimum wage
is su¢ ciently high, some worker types have positive expected benets from
applying. Since () > 0, the rm still selects the most motivated worker
from the pool of applicants at stage 3. If the lowest wage that this worker
would accept is below the minimum wage, the minimum wage is binding.
Otherwise, the rm o¤ers the wage that makes the worker indi¤erent be-
tween accepting and rejecting. However, as above, these workers optimally
do not apply. Hence, the rm always o¤ers wmin.
At stage 2, worker i applies if the expected benets from applying are
positive. Obviously, if a certain worker type has positive expected benets
from applying, all workers with higher motivation also have positive expected
benets from applying. A worker of type i applies if and only if:
f(i)[U(i; wmin)  Uout]  C  0 (12)
where f(i) is the expected probability for a worker of type i of being
selected by the rm and U(i; wmin) is the utility that the worker obtains
if she accepts o¤er wmin. f(i) is determined by the distribution of worker
types:
f(i) = (1  )Ni ni
ni 1X
x=0

1
1 + x

ni   1
x

x(1  )ni 1 x

(13)
where Ni is given by (11). The rst term is the probability that all workers
with  > i do not observe the ad. If any of these workers applies, then
11The assumption that the rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage o¤er implies that even
if there is a single most motivated worker, n = 1, this worker can not capture any rents.
12Note that if C = 0, all workers who observe the ad apply. The rm selects the most
motivated worker and o¤ers her the wage that exactly meets her participation constraint,
as described in Section 3.
13We assume that posting a range of wage o¤ers conditional on a workers motivation
is not credible, due to the unveriability of the level of motivation. Thus, posting a single
wage is the best the rm can do.
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worker i will not be selected by the rm. The second term gives the prob-
ability that worker i is selected from all applicants of the same type. This
probability is the function
1
1 + x
;where x is the number of applicants with
motivation i besides worker i, which follows a binomial distribution.
The rm sets the minimum wage such that expression (12) holds with
equality for the least motivated worker type that it wants to apply. Denote
this worker type by min. As argued above, if wmin < w
0
min, then min >
0min. Expected prots are given by:
E[(;wmin)] =
X
min
F ()(;wmin) (14)
where
F () = (1  )N n [1  (1  )n ] (15)
is the probability that  is the highest level of motivation among the appli-
cants, and (;wmin) is the accompanying level of prot. Suppose the rm
increases the minimum wage from wmin to w0min such that min decreases
by one worker type to 0min. This leads to the following change in expected
prots:
E[] = E[(;w0min)]  E[(;wmin)]
=
X
0min
F ()(;w0min) 
X
min
F ()(;wmin)
which can be written as:
E[] = F (0min)(
0
min; w
0
min) +
X
min
F ()[(;w0min)  (;wmin)] (16)
Increasing the minimum wage leads to a higher probability of lling the
vacancy, as an additional worker type, 0min, has an incentive to apply after
observing the ad. This is reected by the rst term. However, if some
worker with motivation higher than 0min observes the vacancy, the increase
in the minimum wage only leads to additional cost, as this worker would
have applied at the lower minimum wage as well. This is described by the
second term.
The rm sets the minimum wage such that 0  min  . A local
optimum of E[(;wmin)] can be found by stepwise increasing the minimum
wage until the sign of E[] turns negative. Whether there is only one
local (and thus global) optimum is unsure given the general specication of
the distribution of worker types and of the prot function (;wmin). More
specically, if, for a value of wmin above the local optimum, a small increase
in wmin results in a large increase in the probability of lling the vacancy,
then E[(;wmin)] may not be concave in wmin, and, hence, there may be
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more than one local optimum. Restricting the distribution of worker types
such that n = n for all  and (;w0min)   (;wmin) is constant in wmin
(that is, the increase in wmin necessary to attract one additional worker type
is equal for all worker types), both terms of (16) decrease with wmin. This
implies that E[(;wmin)] is concave in wmin and, hence, there exists only
one local and global optimum. Corner solutions cannot be excluded: It is
possible that the optimal min is either 0 or .
4.3 Unobservable Motivation
When the rm can not observe the types of the applicants, it randomly
selects one applicant and makes her a wage o¤er. As in the previous subsec-
tion, we assume that when the wage o¤er is rejected, the rm ends up with
zero prots.
Consider rst the case where the rm has not committed to a minimum
wage. The beliefs of the rm about the distribution of applicantstypes are
crucial in determining the optimal wage o¤er. Suppose that the rm believes
that there exists some l such that only workers with i  l apply after
observing the vacancy. Let wl be the wage such that U(l; wl) = U
out. Given
the rms beliefs, its optimal wage o¤er w is such that w  w  wl. Hence,
workers of type l optimally decide not to apply as the wage o¤er does not
compensate them for the application cost. This, in turn, reduces the rms
optimal wage, which removes the incentives of workers with slightly higher
motivation to apply. As this holds for any l (including ), the market
collapses, as in Akerlofs lemon market. In Akerlofs model, the existence
of bad types drives the good types out of the market. Interestingly, in our
model, it is the withdrawal of the bad types from the market that drives out
the good types.
Again, the rm needs to commit to a minimum wage in order to attract
applicants. In Appendix 3, we derive the optimal minimum wage when
workersmotivation is unobservable. Compared to the case where motiva-
tion is observable, there is an additional selection e¤ect of raising the wage.
As before, a higher minimum wage induces workers who are less motivated
to apply. Hence, the average level of intrinsic motivation of applicants goes
down. If the rm can fully observe applicantsmotivation, this reduction
in average motivation of applicants does not entail a cost since the rm
simply chooses the best motivated worker among the applicants. However,
if applicantsmotivation is unobservable, the rm picks an applicant ran-
domly, and, hence, higher wages reduce the expected level of motivation of
the worker that is hired. The selection e¤ect imposes an additional cost
of increasing the minimum wage compared to the case where motivation is
observable, and so the optimal minimum wage is lower.14
14 If C = 0, the rm need not to commit to a minimum wage to attract applicants.
However, the selection e¤ect makes that the rm might want to commit to a maximum
14
4.4 Motivation Can Be Signaled
Suppose that the rm can not observe the motivation of the applicants, but
applicants can credibly signal their type to the rm.15 Obviously, when
the rm does not commit to a minimum wage, none of the workers apply,
as in the previous subsections. Each applicant anticipates that when she
signals her type, the rm fully extracts all the rents of motivation, leaving
the applicant with the sunk application cost. Because no applicant reveals
her type to the rm, motivation remains unobservable. As we have seen in
the previous subsection, this results in a complete breakdown of the market.
When the rm posts a minimum wage wmin, each applicant signals her
motivation to the rm. The intuition is that signaling increases a workers
probability of getting the job. Consider an applicant with motivation 
and suppose that all other applicants do not signal their motivation. If she
signals, she is certain to get the job. If she does not signal, she only gets
the job if she is randomly selected. Hence, she signals her type as signaling
increases her probability of being selected by the rm. This also holds when
other workers signal. Next, consider workers of the highest but one type of
motivation, h. Signaling is of no avail when a worker of type  is in the
pool of applicants. However, if none of the workers of type  apply, signaling
is benecial, as the rm prefers to select a worker of type h if there are
no workers of type  available. Since workers have no information about
the other applicants and signaling is costless, it is always in the interest of
workers of type h to signal their type. Analogously, all applicants have an
incentive to signal their type so as to increase the probability of getting the
job.
It follows that a worker only gets the job if she is the most motivated
applicant, as in Subsection 4.1 where the rm could observe the motivation
of the applicants. Hence, workers have the same incentives to apply as in
Subsection 4.1, and the rm optimally sets the minimum wage at the same
level.
5 Signaling and Screening with Optimal Monetary
Incentive Schemes
This section shows that the results derived in Section 4 under the assumption
of a xed wage generalise to the case where the rm provides monetary
incentives to the worker, as in Section 3.
wage, in order to reduce the number of relatively less motivated workers in the pool of
applicants, as in Handy and Katz. Note also that a maximum wage is of no use when
C > 0.
15 If signals are not credible, motivation remains unobservable, as all applicants would
signal that they have motivation .
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Figure 2: Intrinsic motivation and the optimal monetary incentive scheme
Suppose the rm wants that only workers with motivation  apply. Anal-
ogous to the previous section, the rm needs to commit to a minimum wage
scheme in order to attract applicants, regardless of whether or not the rm
can observe the motivation of the applicants. The rm has to commit to a
minimum wage scheme that satises the following constraint:
p()

U [w(e); e; e]  Uout	  C  0
where p() is the probability of getting the job for a worker of type , given
by (13) in case of observable motivation and by (A8) in case of unobservable
motivation, respectively. Optimal e¤ort is again described by rst-order
conditions (4) and (5), with i = . Clearly, there exist many wage schemes
that satisfy these conditions. One of these is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2 depicts the marginal product of e¤ort [q0(e)] and the marginal
disutility from e¤ort for three di¤erent types of workers. The latter curves
are obtained by rewriting the rst-order condition for optimal e¤ort of the
worker (4) to:
w0i(e) =  
U2() + iU3()
U1() (17)
where i 2 fm;h; g, m < h < . Equation (17) describes for each level
of e¤ort the minimum reward the rm must provide to induce a worker of
type i to provide an additional unit of e¤ort. Notice that when the rm
creates an incentive scheme which follows (17) exactly, the worker is just
compensated for his (net) disutility from e¤ort. In order to give workers an
incentive to apply, the rm has to make sure that a worker with motivation
min =  ends up (in expected terms) with utility U
out. Hence, the rm
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must o¤er a base salary Bmin such that:
U(Bmin ; 0; 0) = U
out +
C
p(min)
(18)
An optimal minimum wage scheme which induces only workers with
motivation  to apply thus consists of a base salary Bmin , given by (18)
with min = , and a monetary incentive scheme which follows (17) up to
the point where w0(e) = q0(e). Denote the accompanying level of e¤ort by
e . The rms o¤er is:
B +
Z e
0
w0(e)de
This minimum wage o¤er is just su¢ cient to induce workers with motivation
 to apply. All other worker types have negative expected benets from
applying, and, hence, decide not to apply.
Now suppose the rm prefers to give the highest two types an incentive
to apply, types  and h. As in the previous section, this implies that the
rm has to leave a rent to workers of type . The rm optimally trades
o¤ the rents it has to leave in case the selected applicant appears to be a
worker of type  and the e¤ort exerted by a worker of type h. The prot
maximising wage scheme which is acceptable to both types of workers is
described by:
max
eh
P (h)

q (eh) Bh   wh (eh)

+P ()
24q (e) Bh   wh (eh) 
eZ
eh
w0(e)de
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where eh is the level of e¤ort a worker of type h is induced to exert by this
prot maximising scheme, and P (h) and P () are the probabilities that
a worker of type h and a worker of type  are hired, given by (15) when
motivation is observable and by (A10) when motivation is unobservable,
respectively. Base salary Bh is implicitly given by (18) with min = h,
and wh() and w0() are described by (17) with i = h; , respectively. The
rst term in brackets is the rms prot in case a worker of type h is hired,
which happens with probability P (h). In expected terms, the rm does
not leave a rent to these workers. The rst derivative with respect to eh of
this term is equal to zero when eh equals the optimal e¤ort level of workers
of type h under full information, described in Section 3. The second term
in brackets is the rms prot in case a worker of type  is hired, which
happens with probability P (). To meet this workers individual rationality
constraint, the rm must provide monetary incentives as if the worker is of
type h up to e¤ort level eh. Hence, the rm leaves a rent to workers of type
. Starting from e¤ort level eh, the rm just compensates workers of type 
for each additional unit of e¤ort. The rst derivative with respect to eh of
the second term is always negative since w0h(e) > w
0
(e) for any e. Clearly,
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it is in the rms interest to set eh lower than the optimal e¤ort level under
full information, which we derived in Section 3. The prot maximising wage
scheme induces a worker of type h to exert suboptimally low e¤ort so as
to reduce the rents which the rm has to leave in case the o¤er is made to
a worker of type .16 Workers of type  are induced to exert an e¢ cient
level of e¤ort, as in Section 3. The rm must, however, leave a rent to these
workers. The optimal wage scheme which gives types  and h an incentive
to apply is described by:
Bh +
ehZ
0
w0h(e)de+
eZ
eh
w0(e)de (20)
Along the same lines, we can derive the optimal wage scheme when the
rm wants to induce more worker types to apply. The lower min, the
higher the base salary and the higher the incentive wage up to emin must
be in order to give workers with motivation   min an incentive to apply.
The wage scheme is such that each worker type  except   exerts a
suboptimal level of e¤ort, so as to decrease the rents the rm has to leave to
higher types. As in Section 4, the optimal wage scheme entails a trade-o¤
between the probability of lling the vacancy, the rents left to workers, and,
if motivation is unobservable, the expected quality of the selected worker.
It is straightforward to show that the rm needs to commit to a su¢ ciently
high base salary so as to attract applicants and to give them an incentive to
signal their motivation.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied a rms optimal recruitment, selection, and pay-for-
performance practices when workers di¤er in their intrinsic motivation to
work at the rm. We have shown that, when intrinsic motivation can not
be observed by the rm, posting a higher wage may increase the probability
of lling a vacancy, but at the same time decrease the expected motivation
of the hired worker. Screening technologies, like personality and workstyle
tests, work trials, and the use of assessment centres, may help a rm to select
the best motivated worker among the applicants. But these may only help
if the rm commits to pay at least a certain wage. For otherwise, workers
may have an incentive to conceal their motivation or, even worse, to abstain
from applying.
Our model predicts that when workersmotivation is more easy to assess,
workersproductivity and wages will be higher. Productivity is higher since
the rm is better able to select the best-motivated applicant. Wages will also
16For a similar result in a more general context see chapter 7 in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1992).
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be higher as there is less need to discourage low-motivated worker from ap-
plying by o¤ering a low wage. When workersemployment history contains
some information on workersmotivation, older workersmotivation may
be more easy to asses than younger workersmotivation. Adverse selection
problems arising from heterogeneity in workersmotivation may therefore
increase the wage premium on labour market experience. A testable im-
plication of our model therefore is that in sectors where workers intrinsic
motivation is important, wage-experience proles are steeper.
Heterogeneity in workersmotivation may also a¤ect the e¤ects of in-
tensifying competition in an industry. In a related paper, we extend our
model to examine the consequences of creating a fully competitive market
in a sector previously dominated by a monopsonistic rm (Delfgaauw and
Dur). We show that rms in a competitive market provide stronger mone-
tary incentives to workers, pay higher wages, and employ less workers than a
monopsonistic rm. These ndings square well with the empirical evidence
on the e¤ects of privatisation and liberalisation.
We have adopted a very simple concept of workersintrinsic motivation,
namely that workers to a certain extent enjoy exerting e¤ort at work. We
have assumed that this enjoyment of e¤ort is independent of the rms pay
policies. Adopting a more sophisticated concept of intrinsic motivation may
reveal interesting additional e¤ects to the ones we discussed above. For
instance, a higher wage may change the public perception of how noble a
task or job is, which in turn may reduce workersmotivation to do the job.
Seabright (2002) and Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst (2004) have recently
developed models along these lines. Moreover, o¤ering pay-for-performance
may undermine workersintrinsic motivation as they feel that their intrinsic
motivation is not acknowledged by the rm (see Frey, 1997a, and Frey and
Jegen, 2001).
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A Appendix 1
In this appendix we derive the condition under which the total wage com-
pensation decreases in motivation. For this purpose, it is convenient to write
the wage scheme as:
w(e) = q(e) +B (A1)
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Hence, in line with rst-order condition (5), workers get their full marginal
product, while the base salary B is such that the participation constraint of
the worker is just satised:
U(w(e); e; e) = U(q(e) +B; e; e) = Uout (A2)
By combining the optimal wage scheme (A1) and the rst-order conditions
for e¤ort (4) and prot (5), it follows that the optimal level of e¤ort is
implicitly given by:
q0(e)U1() + U2() + U3() = 0 (A3)
In Section 3, we derived the e¤ect of a marginal change in  on the optimal
level of e¤ort:
de
d
=
U3() + eU33()
 @F=@e > 0 (A4)
where @F=@e < 0 is the second-order condition to the workers optimisation
problem (A3). We are interested in the sign of dw(e)d . By using (A1), we can
rewrite this to:
dw(e)
d
=
dq(e)
d
+
dB
d
(A5)
The rst term on the right-hand side of this equation is simply:
dq(e)
d
= q0(e)
de
d
where ded is given by (A4). The second term on the right-hand side of (A5)
can be found by using the participation constraint (A2) and applying the
implicit function theorem:
dB
d
=  eU3
U1
+
[q0(e)U1() + U2() + U3()]
U1()
de
d
=  eU3
U1
where the term in square brackets is zero by rst-order condition (A3) (the
envelop theorem). Hence, we can rewrite (A5) as:
dw(e)
d
= q0(e)
de
d
  eU3()
U1() =
  [U2() + U3()] ded   eU3()
U1()
where the second equality follows from (A3). Total wage compensation thus
decreases in motivation if the following condition holds:
eU3() >   [U2() + U3()] de
d
(A6)
which is identical to condition (9) in the main text.
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B Appendix 2
Suppose the wage results from a bargain between the rm and the worker, of
which the outcome is described by the generalised Nash bargaining function.
The workers bargaining power is denoted by , the rm has bargaining
power 1    (0    1). Note that apart from the total compensation to
the worker, the incentive scheme derived in Section 3 is optimal for both
the rm and the worker. Denote the minimum wage for which the worker is
willing to work by wmin(). The maximum wage the rm is willing to o¤er
is denoted by wmax(). The wage that results from the bargaining is the
minimum wage plus a proportion  of the total rents (the di¤erence between
the maximum and the minimum wage):
w = wmin() + [wmax()  wmin()]
To examine the e¤ect of  on w, we di¤erentiate this function with respect
to :
dw
d
= w0max() + (1  )w0min()
In Section 3 we have shown that w0max() > 0 and w0min() < 0, provided
that condition (9) holds. The wage decreases in motivation if:

  1 <
w0min()
w0max()
Hence, as long as  is su¢ ciently low, the wage decreases in the motivation
of the worker.
C Appendix 3
Suppose the rm puts minimum wage wmin in its ad.17 When motivation is
unobservable a worker of type i applies if and only if:
g(i)[U(i; wmin)  Uout]  C  0 (A7)
where g(i) is the expected probability for a worker with motivation i
of being randomly selected by the rm after applying. This probability is
1
1 + v
, where v is the number of applicants besides worker i. v is a random
variable which follows a binomial distribution. It is easily veried that:
g(i) =
Ni 1X
v=0

1
1 + v

Ni   1
v

v(1  )Ni 1 v

(A8)
17Clearly, this will also be the rms actual o¤er. O¤ering a wage which is higher than
the wage announced in the ad could only be optimal if the rm believed that the least
motivated applicants would reject o¤er wmin. However, these workers anticipate that they
will not be compensated for the application cost and, hence, optimally decide not to apply.
As in the absence of a commitment, the rms beliefs are unsustainable.
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The rm sets the minimum wage such that expression (A7) holds with
equality for the least motivated worker type, min, that it wants to apply.
Expected prots of the rm are given by:
E[(;wmin)] =
X
min
G()(;wmin) (A9)
where G() is the probability that the rm selects an applicant with moti-
vation . This probability is
S
S + Z
, where S is the number of applicants of
type  and Z the number of applicants with a di¤erent type of motivation.
Both S and Z follow a binomial distribution, and their joint distribution is
given by:
P (S = s; Z = z) = P (S = s)P (Z = z)
=

n
s

s(1  )n s

Nmin   n
z

z(1  )Nmin n z
where the rst equality follows from the observation that the two random
variables S and Z are independently distributed. Hence, G() is described
by:
G() =
nX
s=1
Nmin nX
z=0
s
s+ z

n
s

s(1 )n s

Nmin   n
z

z(1 )Nmin n z
(A10)
The summation over s starts at s = 1, because G() = 0 if none of the
workers with motivation  observes the ad. Note that
P
min G() <
1, as there may be no applicant at all, which happens with probability
(1  )Nmin .
Suppose the rm increases the minimum wage from wmin to w0min, such
that min decreases by one worker type to 
0
min. This reduces the probability
of selecting an applicant with motivation  to:
G0() =
nX
s=1
N0
min
 nX
z=0
s
s+ z

n
s

s(1 )n s

N0min   n
z

z(1 )N0min n z
(A11)
Since N0min > Nmin by denition, G
0() < G() for all  2 [min; ]. Intu-
itively, the probability that a worker of a certain type is selected decreases if
the number of worker types that apply increases. This is the selection e¤ect.
As before, the increase in the minimum wage decreases the probability that
nobody applies, as
P
0min G
0() >
P
min G().
The increase in the minimum wage from wmin to w0min leads to the fol-
lowing change in expected prots:
E[] = E[(;w0min)]  E[(;wmin)]
=
X
0min
G0()(;w0min) 
X
min
G()(;wmin)
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which can be rewritten as:
E[] = G0(0min)(
0
min; w
0
min)+
X
min

G0()(;w0min) G()(;wmin)

(A12)
The rst term gives the probability of selecting a worker with motivation
0min and the accompanying prots. The second term indicates that by
increasing wmin to w0min, each worker type   min has a lower probability
of being selected, and, given a selected worker type, the prot of the rm
is lower as a result of the wage increase. This expression is negative, since
G0() < G() for all  2 [min; ] and (;w0min) < (;wmin). As in
Subsecion 4.2, the optimal minimum wage is found by stepwise increasing
the minimum wage until the sign of E[] turns negative. See the last
paragraph of Subsection 4.2.
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